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Aristocratic appeasement: Lord Londonderry, Nazi Germany, 
and the promotion of Anglo-German misunderstanding1
 
All really depends on Hitler, whom it is very difficult to reach. In so far as he is 
reached by Ribbentrop he is misled, for Ribbentrop saw too much of 
Londonderry and Mayfair and too little of England.2
   Hugh Dalton MP, 5 September 1938 
 
Introduction 
It remains a popular belief that the British aristocracy, as a class, was responsible in 
some way for the policy of ‘appeasement’ – ‘the search for peace by the redress of 
German grievances.’3 There is also the belief that many aristocrats were inclined 
towards fascism, and even that some harboured a desire to establish a fascist 
government in the United Kingdom. The fictional character of Lord Darlington in 
Kazuo Ishiguro’s 1989 novel The Remains of the Day epitomizes these perceptions, 
and in some respects resembles the eponymous subject of this article, the seventh 
Marquess of Londonderry (1878–1949).4 It is undeniable that appeasement attracted 
the active support of many British notables, and that some took this a stage further by 
playing a prominent role in promoting better ‘Anglo-German relations’. The 
possession of considerable wealth, status, and a strong sense of ‘duty’ meant that 
politically active aristocrats could, on their own initiative, fly to Germany and receive 
                                                 
1 An early version of this paper was presented at the Seminar Series, Institute of Irish Studies, The 
Queen’s University of Belfast on 21 March 2002.  
2 Dalton, diary, 5 September 1938, in Ben Pimlott (ed.), The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton: 1918–40, 
1945–60 (London: Cape, 1986), p. 237. 
3 R.A.C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World 
War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), p. 1. 
4 MP for Maidstone (1905–15), thereafter the House of Lords; Finance Member of the Air Council 
(1919–20); Under-Secretary of State for Air (1920–1); Leader of the Senate and Minister of Education 
in Northern Ireland (1921–6); First Commissioner of Works (1928–9); Secretary of State for Air 
(1931–5); Leader of the House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal (1935). 
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a warm welcome from leading Nazis. Motivated in part by what they regarded as the 
National Government’s diplomatic inactivity, these self-appointed emissaries, mainly 
but not exclusively Conservatives, sought to demonstrate that it was possible, indeed 
essential, to parley openly with the Nazi leadership, to address German grievances, 
and thereby avoid another European conflict. 
 The Nazis encouraged such visits, hoping they might hasten direct contact 
between leading figures of each country that would pave the way for Germany to 
exercise a free hand in Eastern Europe. Arguments ranging from a shared hostility to 
communism to racial affinity were employed by Berlin to garner support amongst 
British Conservatives. The Conservative dominated National Government, however, 
was wary of the effect of an Anglo-German agreement on relations with France, and 
unhappy with the self-declared role of amateur diplomats. Having failed time and 
again to give an unequivocal commitment to French security, the British government 
felt it could not bind Britain unilaterally to any far-reaching settlement with a 
dictatorship. Amateur diplomats such as Londonderry sought to rebut this assertion, 
arguing that an Anglo-German agreement could be framed within a larger ‘Great 
Power pact’. This stance was eventually adopted by the government, following 
Neville Chamberlain’s appointment as Prime Minister in May 1937. 
 Chamberlain’s agreement with Hitler at Munich in September 1938 fulfilled 
the hopes of those who had long advocated a deal with the Nazi government. Unlike 
the Prime Minister, however, they were relatively powerless to protect their 
reputations during the diplomatically disastrous months that followed. Chamberlain 
saved his own position by reorienting the form – if not the substance – of British 
policy, not least by taking steps to prepare Britain for war. Outside the government, 
most advocates of appeasement shrank from the public eye, reassuring everyone of 
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their patriotic commitment to Britain and its civic institutions. For a minority, 
however, including the Prime Minister, the worsening situation amplified the 
importance of a peace settlement with Germany. If public hostility to such utterances 
ensured that Chamberlain restricted his views to the privacy of Cabinet debate, then it 
encouraged proponents to speak out in favour of a new agreement. Amongst these the 
most notorious were prominent aristocrats, with the eighth Duke of Buccleuch and the 
second Duke of Westminster maintaining this position even after the outbreak of war 
on 3 September 1939. Londonderry never went quite that far, but he did call for a new 
agreement, and volunteered to act as an intermediary, until August 1939. He was only 
stopped by the intervention of the Foreign Secretary. 
 There have been many studies dealing with appeasement, mostly focusing on 
the government. There has been less interest in those outside government who were 
equally if not more keen on the policy. Notable exceptions include works by A.L. 
Rowse, Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, Richard Griffiths, N.J. Crowson, and 
Norman Rose.5 References to British aristocrats and the Nazis are scattered 
throughout most of these books, but their inclusion has more to do with their status as 
government ministers, or their role in pressure groups, than their class background per 
se. Only David Cannadine gives serious attention to the relationship between the 
aristocracy and the far right in his Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy.6 In 
most of these works Londonderry’s contributions to the appeasement debate are 
quoted, usually from the same two sources, his polemic Ourselves and Germany, and 
                                                 
5 A.L. Rowse, All Souls and Appeasement: A Contribution to Contemporary History (London: 
Macmillan, 1961); Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1963); Richard Griffiths, Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi 
Germany, 1933–9 (London: Constable, 1980); N.J. Crowson, Facing Fascism: the Conservative Party 
and the European Dictators 1935–1940 (London: Routledge, 1997); Norman Rose, The Cliveden Set: 
Portrait of an Exclusive Fraternity (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000). 
6 David Cannadine, Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (London: Macmillan, 1990). 
Cardiff Historical Papers 2007/4 
N.C. Fleming 4 
memoirs, Wings of Destiny.7 A far fuller picture, however, emerges when these works 
are set alongside Londonderry’s voluminous correspondence with leading figures in 
the British and German governments. This vast archive was largely ignored until the 
relatively recent publication of Ian Kershaw’s Making friends with Hitler, and N.C. 
Fleming’s The Marquess of Londonderry.8 The former is a comprehensive overview 
of Londonderry’s recommendations to his own government on the appeasement of 
Germany, and a narrative of his interaction with the authorities in Berlin. The latter 
biography also addresses these themes, and examines the relevance of Londonderry’s 
aristocratic background to his long political career, exploring how it shaped 
Londonderry’s actions in the public sphere and what this reveals about interwar 
political culture. This article adopts a similar position, investigating how 
Londonderry’s aristocratic status lies at the very heart of why and how he became 
involved in amateur diplomacy, why the Nazis encouraged him, and how the resulting 
mutual misunderstandings served to undermine the very cause both sought to 
promote. 
 
Motivation 
If many Conservatives, including aristocrats, were sympathetic to the policy of 
appeasing German grievances, how individuals acted on this could differ 
                                                 
7 Lord Londonderry, Ourselves and Germany (London: Penguin, 1938); Wings of Destiny (London: 
Macmillan, 1943). 
8 Ian Kershaw, Making Friends with Hitler: Lord Londonderry and Britain’s Road to War (London: 
Allan Lane, 2004); N.C. Fleming, The Marquess of Londonderry: Aristocracy, Power and Politics in 
Britain and Ireland (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005). See also N.C. Fleming, ‘Lord Londonderry and 
education reform in 1920s Northern Ireland’, History Ireland, 9, 1 (2001), pp. 36–9; ‘Lord 
Londonderry and Ulster politics, 1921–6’, Irish History: A Research Yearbook, 2 (Dublin: Four Courts 
Press, 2003), pp. 72–80; ‘Old and new Unionism: the seventh Marquess of Londonderry, 1905–1921’, 
in D. George Boyce and Alan O’Day (eds), Ireland in Transition, 1867–1921 (London: Routledge, 
2004), pp. 223–40; ‘“The Londonderry Herr”: Lord Londonderry and the appeasement of Nazi 
Germany’, History Ireland, 13, 1 (2005), pp. 31–5; ‘The first government of Northern Ireland, 
education reform and the failure of anti-populist unionism, 1921–1925’, Twentieth Century British 
History, 18, 2 (2007), pp. 146–69. 
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significantly, especially given the rapidly changing diplomatic situation of the 1930s. 
Londonderry, after all, was not the only aristocrat to visit Germany, nor the only 
former government minister, but it was rare for amateur diplomats to possess both 
attributes. Similarly, although Londonderry was far from being the only proponent of 
appeasement in the mid 1930s, he was one of a dwindling band who maintained this 
call even after the collapse of the Munich agreement. This raises the question of his 
motivation. Why did a retired politician with enormous wealth at his disposal engage 
in such a controversial campaign? The evidence points to two key factors: his 
contentious period in office as Secretary of State for Air and a lifelong determination 
to forge a successful career in politics. 
 The latter was drummed into him as a child by parents who actively sought to 
match their immense financial and social status with appropriate political office – 
with modest success.9 After some initial difficulties, and against the prevailing trend, 
Londonderry’s aristocratic title and immense wealth enabled him to make a successful 
claim on successive government offices, especially in the light of his constructive role 
in Irish politics during the First World War and in the early 1920s, and for his role as 
a ‘moderate’ coal owner during the 1926 General Strike. In 1928 Stanley Baldwin 
brought Londonderry into the Cabinet as First Commissioner of Works, a post he 
reclaimed – to the astonishment of political observers – in the emergency National 
Government of August 1935. Once in office, however, Londonderry’s background 
tended to dispose him to place departmental loyalty above the electoral and political 
concerns of his colleagues, raising the heckles of those, both Conservative and 
Labour, who resented the appointment of a marquess to high office.10 Had his critics 
                                                 
9 Lord Londonderry, ‘In the Days of my Youth’, T.P.’s & Cassell’s Weekly, 21 March 1925, pp. 806–
10; Fleming, Marquess of Londonderry, pp. 10–12. 
10 See Stuart Ball (ed.), Parliament and Politics in the Age of Baldwin and MacDonald: the Headlam 
Diaries 1923–1935 (London: Historians’ Press, 1992). 
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examined Londonderry’s performance in Irish politics with greater care, they might 
have foreseen the problems that arose in the mid 1930s. Patrician high-handedness in 
Ulster might appeal to sensible Englishmen wary of Ulster’s sectarian politics, but its 
repetition during the highly-charged disarmament debates of the early 1930s proved 
much less palatable. Careful observers would have noted a tendency towards 
‘appeasement’ and ‘moderation’ in Londonderry’s attempts to create an inclusive 
society in Northern Ireland, in his effort to propose a resolution to the General Strike, 
and in his obvious sympathy for German grievances during the League of Nations 
Disarmament Conference. 
 Londonderry’s appointment as Secretary of State for Air following the 
election victory of the National Government in November 1931 led to unproven 
allegations that it was the result of Lady Londonderry’s hold on the Prime Minister, 
Ramsay MacDonald.11 In time, disapproval on this basis would make way for more 
substantial criticisms of Londonderry’s approach to the Disarmament Conference. His 
objections to a ban on aerial bombing, echoing the views of his senior officials and 
staff officers, challenged the position adopted by most of the cabinet, including his 
party leader, Baldwin, who as Lord President was Prime Minister in all but name. The 
arguments of the ‘airmen’ succeeded in producing a more equivocal British policy at 
Geneva, to the anger of those who had hoped for an outright ban on aerial warfare. 
The collapse of the Geneva conference in late 1934 produced a further crisis for the 
Air Ministry when, in March 1935, Hitler informed visiting British ministers that he 
had an air force of equal strength to the Royal Air Force. Not only was the Air 
Ministry’s intelligence judged negligent, but the Air Minister compounded the offence 
by urging caution in the face of backbench calls for rapid rearmament. 
                                                 
11 Nicholas Owen, ‘MacDonald’s parties: the Labour party and “aristocratic embrace”, 1922−31’, 
Twentieth Century British History, 18, 1 (2007), pp. 1−53. 
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 A Cabinet reshuffle in May 1935 removed Londonderry to the sinecure of 
Leader of the House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal. However, his role at Geneva and 
his continued presence in the Cabinet made him a bogeyman for the Labour party’s 
new leader, Clement Attlee, who singled him out in Labour’s November 1935 general 
election manifesto. For Attlee, Londonderry was not only an aristocrat and a coal 
owner, but also a warmonger – the self-confessed saviour of aerial bombing.12 Many 
Conservative backbenchers, on the contrary, regarded Londonderry as an effete Air 
Minister, who was incapable of the great task of rearmament. Not surprisingly, 
Londonderry was dropped from the Cabinet altogether following the General 
Election. It left him deeply bitter towards Baldwin, who had replaced MacDonald as 
Prime Minister, and determined to defend himself from the accusation that he had 
misled Parliament on German air estimates, as well as from the more personal slur 
that he was a warmonger. He would do so by following the example of a number of 
British aristocrats, such as the eleventh Marquess of Lothian, who had flown on 
personal visits to the Führer. In this way, Londonderry hoped to recast himself as a 
peacemaker.13
 Londonderry, like many others, admired the transformation of Hitler’s 
Germany, but his rationale for promoting Anglo-German understanding was largely 
negative, based on the widespread fear of another world war and its consequences for 
Britain: ‘We beat the Germans and I am very glad we did, and it is just because I 
don’t want to have to do it again that I have gone all out to capture the Germans 
another way.’14 Long before Hitler became Chancellor in January 1933, Londonderry 
argued for the conciliation of the Weimar Republic. Like many British observers of 
                                                 
12 F.W.S. Craig, British General Election Manifestos, 1900–1974 (London: Macmillan, 1975), p. 108. 
13 Lothian to Londonderry, 7 February 1935, Londonderry papers, Public Record Office of Northern 
Ireland (hereafter D/3099), D/3099/2/17/56. 
14 Londonderry to Lady Milner, 11 March 1937, Londonderry papers, Durham County Record Office 
(hereafter D/Lo), D/Lo/C/237 (8). 
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foreign policy he had a sense of victor’s guilt for the harsher provisions of Versailles. 
In August 1923 he criticised publicly the French government’s determined pursuance 
of reparations.15 A month later he argued that, although Germany needed some 
punishment, ‘it was necessary to consider the future of the world and the best basis on 
which peace could be established.’16 The following year in an Armistice Day radio 
broadcast, Londonderry called on the country not to harbour animosities when 
remembering the Great War.17 In 1929, as First Commissioner of Works, he praised 
the Locarno Treaty for bringing Germany into the League of Nations and hoped it 
would establish ‘for all time an understanding throughout the world that there was a 
desire for peace’.18 Just prior to his appointment to the emergency National 
Government, he praised the decision of the American President, Herbert Hoover, to 
postpone Germany’s repayment of international debts.19 The following month 
Londonderry warned: 
the world’s danger was a German collapse… Communists would welcome it. They 
were out to destroy everything in which this country believed. If there were not a 
satisfactory end to the deliberations of the nations Germany would be driven into 
the hands of the Communists… it was our duty to give all the assistance we could 
to prevent it.20
 As a Cabinet minister, Londonderry’s sympathy for Germany was constrained 
by deliberations at Geneva. In November 1934 he urged fellow ministers to readmit 
Germany to the League so that a new settlement could be reached.21 The 
establishment of a Nazi government in January 1933 only reinforced his view that a 
                                                 
15 The Times, 27 August 1923. 
16 The Times, 25 October 1923. 
17 Typed copy of Londonderry’s BBC broadcast, 7.35 p.m., 11 November 1924, D/3099/5/13. 
18 The Times, 1 March 1929. 
19 The Times, 25 June 1931. 
20 The Times, 20 July 1931. 
21 Londonderry to Lord Hailsham, 22 November 1934, D/3099/2/19/4A. 
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deal should be struck at the earliest opportunity; in May 1932 he had warned of their 
coming to power unless German grievances were addressed.22 The Nazis’ domestic 
policies did not lessen his determination: ‘they were the rulers of the Reich and they 
were the people in the circumstances who alone could be approached.’23 
Londonderry’s suggestion of November 1934 was buried under other government 
considerations, but it allowed him to argue in later years that he had been ignored 
when Britain might have dealt with Germany from a position of strength.24
 Out of office, Londonderry no longer regarded the League of Nations as a 
suitable forum through which an agreement with Germany might be reached, not least 
because of his own intimate experience of League affairs. Instead, after some initial 
difficulties communicating his beliefs to former colleagues, he took inspiration from 
his forebear, Viscount Castlereagh, later second Marquess of Londonderry, who as 
Foreign Secretary under the second Earl of Liverpool had helped to establish the 
Concert of Europe: 
I have always been guided by the doctrines of Castlereagh and the Duke of 
Wellington who recognised that as soon as the indemnity… was paid by France 
after the Napoleonic Wars, occupation should come to an end and France should 
have the full opportunity of regaining her equilibrium and playing her part in 
international affairs.25
As Londonderry wrote to his successor as Lord Privy Seal, the third Viscount Halifax, 
in December 1936, any new agreement should be reached between the ‘Great Powers’ 
at a conference resembling the Congress of Vienna.26 Like many others, particularly 
on the right, Londonderry regarded a stable Europe as necessary not only for the 
                                                 
22 Londonderry, notes for a public lecture, 4 May 1932, D/3099/2/16/22. 
23 Londonderry, Wings of Destiny, p. 158. 
24 Ibid., p. 118–19. 
25 Londonderry to McKee, editor of Belfast News-Letter, 5 January 1938, D/3099/2/21/A/4. 
26 Londonderry to Halifax, 24 December 1936, D/3099/2/18/18B. 
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prosperity of the continent and for Britain, but also so that both could meet the twin 
challenges of Soviet Communism and unrelenting American economic growth. 
 Londonderry’s constant citation of Castlereagh also served a more personal 
purpose, linking him to a great European diplomat in a peculiarly aristocratic way, a 
connection he was keen to impress on his German hosts. The Nazis, however, needed 
little encouragement. Hitler and his party advisor on foreign affairs, Joachim von 
Ribbentrop, believed that a clash with Britain would be averted if a bilateral 
agreement could be reached allowing Germany to exercise hegemony in Eastern 
Europe. Nazi leaders admired Britain, its relative social cohesion, observation of 
convention, and its consequent conformity.27 These attributes meant that Britain was 
not merely a highly appealing ally, but also a potentially formidable enemy. To ensure 
that the two states never again would go to war, Ribbentrop sought to woo Britain’s 
aristocracy so that they could effectively press their government for a new settlement. 
In keeping with Hitler’s tendency to use unconventional sources of information and 
methods of government, Ribbentrop ran his own foreign affairs bureau, the 
Dienststelle Ribbentrop, which fostered contacts with pro-Germans and anti-
Communists in Britain.28
 Ribbentrop’s assessment of British politics was, of course, seriously flawed, 
based as it was on simplistic assumptions about British power and designed to 
circumvent official channels. Appealing to Hitler’s unconventional approach to 
diplomacy and government in general, it was also intended to elevate Ribbentrop’s 
importance in the Nazi government and international relations. In spite of the 
strategy’s obvious flaws, it is not surprising that it was greeted initially with 
                                                 
27 Gerwin Strobl, The Germanic Isle: Nazi Perceptions of Britain (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 31. 
28 G.T. Waddington, ‘“An idyllic and unruffled atmosphere of complete Anglo-German 
misunderstanding”: Aspects of the Operations of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop in Great Britain, 1934–
1938’, History, 82 (1997), p. 46. 
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enthusiasm by those whose patronage Ribbentrop sought: Britain’s beleaguered 
aristocracy. It appeared to challenge the unwelcome reality that their power had 
declined irreversibly, and it provided a new political role for notables that did not 
depend on their membership of the British government. It was, initially, a mutually 
satisfying embrace, for like the Nazis, sympathetic aristocrats had little moral or 
financial difficulty in ignoring the proper diplomatic channels. In the end, however, 
despite the intentions of both parties, this unusual relationship only served to 
encourage and heighten confusion in the two countries’ relations. 
 
Rationalisation 
Londonderry’s advocacy of a conference of great powers was not simply a frivolous 
exercise highlighting his familial antecedents. It was underpinned by a widely-held 
belief that the League of Nations had proved itself incapable of acting as the broker 
and guarantor of binding international agreements. Successive failures by the League 
to deal effectively with international crises made it look impotent. In contrast to those 
who blamed this on the failure of the larger member states to enforce the League’s 
collective will, many British Conservatives, like Londonderry, put the blame squarely 
on the smaller member states. Their increasing prominence in League of Nations’ 
deliberations was an unwelcome development in itself for the United Kingdom, one of 
the few great powers in the League, but it was especially frustrating when it was 
believed to be detrimental to the influence of larger member states, particularly on 
matters concerning the conduct of warfare. Domestic pressure kept Britain in the 
League, but as Halifax remarked privately in December 1936 to Lord Cecil of 
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Chelwood, a champion of Geneva, the League was becoming a ‘mockery’, 
particularly as the USA, Japan, and Germany were not members.29
 According to Londonderry and many other Conservatives, stability in Europe 
was best guaranteed through agreements made outside the League, allowing the great 
powers to settle their differences without the legalistic and internationalist constraints 
of Geneva. The Locarno pacts of 1925 demonstrated that such arrangements were 
easier outside the confines of the League, not least as it allowed the main signatories 
to ignore the concerns of Germany’s eastern neighbours. Rather than continue to pay 
lip-service to the League of Nations, Londonderry and many others on the right of the 
Conservative party argued that Britain should take the lead by making a definite 
commitment to reach further agreements between the great powers. 
 A minority of Conservatives, led by Winston Churchill, also believed that 
Britain should grasp the initiative in European affairs, and that communism was a 
menace to European stability, but rejected the negative view of the League held by the 
majority of their colleagues on the Conservative benches. By the mid 1930s, 
Churchill, who had once been hostile to the League, increasingly linked his vigorous 
campaign for rearmament with support for it, not only to build alliances across the 
political parties, but also to champion collective security as an alternative to 
Chamberlain’s appeasement of German grievances. 
 Chamberlain, on the other hand, believed that Churchill’s policy increased the 
likelihood of a disadvantageous war, not only by provoking Hitler before Britain had 
rearmed fully, but also because collective security increased the casus belli. Britain 
should show the way forward in Europe, Chamberlain agreed, but it should do so by 
encouraging the leaders of its great powers to engage in high level discussions with 
                                                 
29 Andrew Roberts, ‘The Holy Fox’: The Life of Lord Halifax (London: Phoenix, 1991), p. 55. 
Cardiff Historical Papers 2007/4 
Aristocratic appeasement 13
one another, expediting opportunities for international agreement on a range of issues 
crucial to the stability of the continent. Nazi Germany should be treated not as a 
pariah, but as a great power, and persuaded of the need to discuss its grievances with 
other great powers. Chamberlain hoped that through this process, Germany’s 
rearmament could be limited, thereby lessening the threat to Britain and France. Its 
territorial ambitions might also be constrained, although this was not Chamberlain’s 
primary concern. Like Churchill, Chamberlain and other appeasers believed that 
Britain must rearm to strengthen its militarily position, but not in a manner that risked 
alienating Hitler. Peace in Europe, at least in the short term, would be guaranteed by 
conciliating Germany – a view that attracted considerable support in Britain in the 
years leading up to Munich, but one that lost much of its credibility in the months that 
followed.30 It was against this changing tide of opinion that Londonderry continued to 
swim. 
 
First impressions 
Londonderry initiated his new political role with a private visit to Germany at the end 
of January 1936. Rather than viewing his action as inappropriate for a former Cabinet 
minister, Londonderry’s saw his period in office as justification for his amateur 
diplomacy, distinguishing him from other visiting aristocrats, and to some extent 
vindicating his record as Air Minister. He met first with the German Air Minister, 
Hermann Göring, one of Hitler’s closest henchmen, and under his supervision toured 
German aircraft factories and Luftwaffe training facilities. Londonderry, his wife, and 
youngest daughter spent seven weeks in Germany, receiving ‘lavish’ treatment 
wherever they went, including attendance at the Winter Olympics as guests of the 
                                                 
30 See Parker, Chamberlain, passim. 
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state, and social engagements with pro-Nazi German aristocrats including the Prince 
of Hesse, the Duke and Duchess of Brunswick, and the Duke of Saxe-Coburg.31 At 
private meetings, dinners, and evening receptions, Londonderry also held discussions 
with senior figures in the German government, including the foreign minister, Baron 
von Neurath, the Deputy Führer, Rudolf Hess, the propaganda minister, Joseph 
Goebbels, and Hitler himself.32
 All this, of course, constituted the Dienststelle Ribbentrop’s strategy for 
wooing what it regarded as highly influential figures in British society, and drumming 
into them the pressing need for an ‘Anglo-German arrangement of all the complex 
problems surrounding present-day international affairs’.33 At a day-long meeting with 
Hess and Ribbentrop on 1 February, Londonderry was informed repeatedly of the 
‘danger of Bolshevism’ and the need for the British Empire and Germany to forge an 
anti-communist alliance. Londonderry shared such fears, but was less convinced 
about demands for the return of former German colonies, regarding it in typically 
patrician fashion as the reflection of an ‘inferiority complex’.34 Several days later, on 
4 February, Londonderry had a two-hour audience with Hitler, which was also 
attended by Hess and Ribbentrop. In response to Londonderry’s appreciation of being 
treated like an official representative, Hitler replied that he welcomed ‘unofficial’ 
visits. Like his lieutenants, the Führer was keen to press for an anti-communist 
alliance, and gave a long ‘tirade’ on the threat of Russia. He was notably less effusive 
when answering Londonderry’s questions about rearmament, Germany’s aims, and 
the League of Nations, preferring either to ignore them or to respond with veiled 
threats about the failure of Anglo-German understanding. 
                                                 
31 Londonderry, Wings of Destiny, p. 171; The Times, 6 February 1936.  
32 See Goebbels, diary, 6 February 1936, in Elke Fröhlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, 
Teil 1, Aufzeichnungen 1923–1941, vol. 3/II (Munich: Saur, 2001). 
33 Londonderry, Ourselves and Germany, pp. 81–2. 
34 Ibid. 
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 Londonderry was aware that Hitler had been evasive, but he was clear about 
what the Germans wanted to communicate through him and flattered by the reception 
he had received throughout Germany. In contrast, he was deeply disappointed about 
the relative indifference shown to him in Britain on his return. Only one of his former 
cabinet colleagues, Oliver Stanley, expressed any interest in the visit, and Stanley was 
his son-in-law.35 Londonderry was ignored by important figures such as Baldwin and 
Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, in part because it 
was all they could do to demonstrate their hostility to amateur diplomacy. 
Nevertheless, Londonderry was not ignored completely: The Times had followed his 
tour, Sir Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, took note of his findings, and in 
June the backbench 1922 Committee included Londonderry on their programme of 
speakers.36
 If enthusiasm was relatively muted, then hostility to the visit was more 
vociferous, and the Londonderrys’ role as leading society hosts was effectively ended. 
As Harold Nicolson noted: 
My new pal Maureen Stanley asked me to come round and meet her father who is 
just back from hob-nobbing with Hitler. Now I admire Londonderry in a way, since 
it is fine to remain 1760 in 1936; besides he is a real gent. But I do deeply 
disapprove of ex-Cabinet ministers trotting across to Germany at this moment. It 
gives the impression of secret negotiations...37
Londonderry was aware of such hostility, warning his wife, ‘we shall be left out of 
everything and it will be a trifle galling, but if you understand it, and are ready for it, 
and I have got you, I feel I don’t mind.’38
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 More controversially, Londonderry returned the hospitality of his German 
hosts with invitations to visit his estates at Mount Stewart, County Down and at 
Wynyard, County Durham. In 1937 he took it upon himself to invite Göring to attend 
the coronation of George VI, but his invitation was turned down on account of 
organised opposition to the visit.39 Only Ribbentrop was able to avail himself of 
Londonderry’s hospitality, particularly after he became Ambassador to London in 
October 1936.40 Ribbentrop became so closely associated with Londonderry through 
these visits and other social engagements that he earned the sobriquet ‘the 
Londonderry Herr’.41 Londonderry later claimed that he did not like Ribbentrop, but 
at the time he was a perfect host to the ambassador, who repaid him in turn with 
further visits to Germany and a sense of playing an important part in a great 
endeavour. Moreover, Ribbentrop shared Londonderry’s desire for a return to 
nineteenth-century power politics as a means of accommodating German territorial 
expansion; he would have appreciated Londonderry’s references to Castlereagh and 
Metternich.42 In this sense, both men failed to understand Hitler, who preferred 
instead to see the world in ideological and racial terms. Hitler’s patience with 
Ribbentrop’s methods was largely tactical. 
 
Promoting understanding 
On 6 March, two months after Londonderry’s visit to Germany, the Wehrmacht 
occupied the demilitarised Rhineland. In what would prove to be a recurring strategy, 
Hitler accompanied this with calls for a new peace settlement. Londonderry, in 
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contrast to the majority of British Conservatives’ restrained reaction, defended the 
occupation in a letter to The Times.43 Repeating German arguments against Versailles 
and the French, he advocated the Germans’ right to run their country as they 
pleased.44 The poor reaction to his letter made Londonderry question whether he 
should continue in his new role, but his sense of mission was emboldened by his 
wife’s enthusiasm; she continued to enjoy her own, more intimate, correspondence 
with Hitler and Göring.45 Londonderry also received encouragement from Lord 
Beaverbrook, who praised his letter in The Times as ‘brilliantly done’.46 In reply 
Londonderry admitted: 
I am megalomaniac enough to think that we can dominate the whole situation but 
Baldwin can’t do it. Neville is too parochial, in fact I see no one who can fill my 
bill. I should like to do it myself but my record is not good enough. I could not 
carry the people. 
Whilst I know what ought to be done I have too many gaps in my intelligence to do 
it. Whether a democracy could do what I want I am not quite sure. So I am looking 
on...47
Beaverbrook replied, ‘It is your duty to go back into public life. And, if you will allow 
me to say so, you should go without the slightest feeling against Baldwin.’48
 Many Conservatives who were sympathetic towards Germany felt that the 
occupation of the Rhineland would be Hitler’s furthest expansion westwards, and so 
the government dismissed the possibility of invoking sanctions in case it drove Berlin 
closer to Rome. Nevertheless, divisions within the party necessitated changes in 
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foreign policy, including the virtual recognition of Italian rule in Abyssinia, further 
diplomatic efforts with Germany, and increased rearmament. Londonderry had always 
been in favour of rearmament, but now he grew concerned that it was not being 
balanced effectively enough with diplomacy.49 Although he refrained from 
advocating the return of former German colonies for fear of alienating himself 
completely in Britain, in April he repeated his call for a settlement with Hitler.50 In 
private, he tried to moderate the situation by encouraging his cousin, Winston 
Churchill, the most vociferous critic of the National Government’s foreign policy, to 
‘go easy with Baldwin’, and urged Göring to avoid policies that caused anxiety in 
Britain.51
 By July the government had begun to take some interest in Londonderry’s 
visit, a sea-change facilitated in part by improved relations between Baldwin and his 
former Air Minister.52 Previously, on 21 May, Londonderry had written yet again to 
the Prime Minister complaining about his removal from the Cabinet, adding 
cryptically that, ‘I have had a most interesting letter from Göring to-day. It is meant 
for propaganda but it has a value’.53 Londonderry followed his letter to the Prime 
Minister with a press statement denying that he had misled Baldwin on air parity with 
Germany whilst Air Minister. Days later, Baldwin made a statement to the House of 
Commons to the effect that he had not meant anyone to think that Londonderry had 
misled him.54 Thus the way was paved for Lord Halifax to meet with Londonderry 
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and discuss his findings, and for their subsequent correspondence on the latter’s 
proposals for better Anglo-German relations.55
 The rapprochement was short lived. Londonderry echoed Hitler’s suggestion 
at their first meeting, pressing Halifax to adopt an anti-communist policy that would 
provide common ground with Germany on which further understandings could be 
based.56 Halifax countered this by stressing the need for a general settlement and 
cautioned against the alienation of Russia.57 In turn, Londonderry criticised foreign 
policy ‘drift’, accused the government of ‘misunderstanding’ him, and warned that 
war loomed if they avoided talking to Hitler and merely rearmed.58 In reacting badly 
to Halifax, Londonderry not only misunderstood the broader concerns of British 
foreign policy and his own role, but recklessly harmed his already low standing 
amongst former colleagues. The government was not interested in his personal 
opinion, but rather in what Hitler and other senior Nazis conveyed through him. The 
Lord Privy Seal, who was renowned for his good nature, easily dismissed his 
predecessor’s outburst, assuring him that he had no intention of alienating Germany.59
 Having taken months to communicate his findings to a senior member of the 
government and having failed to convince him of the pressing need for an Anglo-
German agreement, Londonderry began to rethink his proposals. He developed his 
idea of a conference of great powers, to include Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, 
but not Russia.60
My desire is to pin Hitler down to peace under all circumstances for a period of 
time if necessary … if the four great powers of Europe with no reservations took 
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this line, there can be no war … it is no use crediting the smaller nations with any 
actual power in this issue ... In default of a definite reply from Hitler in a 
conference of actual plenipotentiaries, which on the lines I suggest has a 
resemblance to Vienna … we should announce at once that we were proposing to 
take the definite line of power politics and give up for the time being the doctrines 
which we have sought to develop.61
 At the end of October, on Londonderry’s way back from a tour of Eastern 
Europe during which he enjoyed the hospitality of King Carol of Romania and the 
rightwing Prince Bibesco, Londonderry had a second meeting with Hitler.62 He did 
not record what was said at the meeting, or if Hitler approved, or indeed 
acknowledged, his proposal for a four-power pact, but it is implicit in Londonderry’s 
subsequent correspondence with Halifax that the meeting dealt with the former 
German colonies, eastward expansion, and Hitler’s dislike of the Foreign Secretary, 
Anthony Eden. It is also certain, from what Londonderry told Halifax, that Hitler 
informed his guest of Germany’s next move a year in advance of the Czech crisis: ‘it 
appears to me that German policy is moving in the direction of Danzig and Polish 
interests, and also Czechoslovakia, and it would not surprise me if the next sudden 
demarche were not some movement in that direction.’63
 The years of foreign policy drift under Baldwin ended in May 1937 with the 
appointment of Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister. Thereafter the government 
articulated and pursued a two-fold policy of appeasement and rearmament. 
Londonderry had always had a grudge against Chamberlain, but he welcomed the end 
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of drift. Moreover, he agreed with the new leader’s belief in the sincerity of Hitler’s 
requests for a peaceful settlement, and both men believed this could be brought about 
by an agreement between the great powers. Londonderry did not, however, articulate 
Chamberlain’s belief in ‘economic appeasement’ – the improvement of Germany’s 
economic situation as a means of persuading Hitler to adopt peaceful policies and 
limit armaments.64 This was not so much a difference on principle as a reflection of 
Londonderry’s ignorance of economic matters. Despite their common attitude towards 
Germany, their advocacy of a four-power pact, and Londonderry’s public support for 
Chamberlain, the two men rarely corresponded or met. 
 Following a promising start to 1937, Anglo-German relations suffered a series 
of setbacks, culminating in September with Hitler’s use of that year’s Nuremburg 
rally to demand the return of Germany’s former colonies. His outburst was clearly 
directed at Britain and reflected the fact that Hitler no longer held out any hope of an 
Anglo-German agreement. Prior to the rally, Ribbentrop had come to realise, rather 
belatedly, that power in Britain did not lie with the aristocracy. The perceived 
usefulness of Londonderry and others to the Nazis was severely diminished and Hitler 
was now determined to seek other allies. Nevertheless, Ribbentrop continued to use 
sympathisers to disseminate words of reassurance and goodwill in Britain. The 
Dienststelle Ribbentrop’s main vehicle for this was the Anglo-German Fellowship. 
The nine hundred members of this exclusive dining club, of which Londonderry had 
been a member since February 1936, continued to call for increased Anglo-German 
understanding, unaware that the cause they served was a sham. 
 It is ironic that Londonderry might have had a hand in this development, not 
least by demonstrating the failure of amateur diplomacy. He had returned to Germany 
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in September 1937 – the same month in which Hitler hosted the Italian premier, 
Benito Mussolini, for a state visit – accepting Göring’s invitation to join him for a 
hunt. In response to his host’s ‘less conciliatory’ attitude, and his defence of 
Germany’s alliance with Italy, Londonderry informed Ribbentrop afterwards that the 
meeting had been unsatisfactory, blaming its failure on the arrival of Mussolini.65 In 
his subsequent correspondence with Göring, Londonderry protested that he had barely 
any influence over his former government colleagues and recommended that they deal 
instead with the new British ambassador in Berlin, Neville Henderson.66 When 
Ribbentrop made his final ambassadorial report to Berlin in January 1938 before 
becoming Hitler’s Foreign Minister, he cited a recent letter from Londonderry to 
illustrate his realisation that the British aristocracy lacked any authority over their 
government. Without the possibility of an agreement on the lines that he and British 
sympathisers had been advocating, Ribbentrop concluded that Britain was the Reich’s 
main enemy.67
 
Promoting misunderstanding 
Just as the Nazis were downgrading the usefulness of Londonderry, the British 
government, contrary to his later complaints, became very interested in his recent 
findings: worsening relations between London and Berlin made informal contacts 
more valuable to the former. Following his visit to Göring, Londonderry met with 
Chamberlain, and even Baldwin asked for a meeting.68 A poker-faced Prime Minister 
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left Londonderry unhappy, but Halifax compensated by his increased interest.69 It is 
highly probable that government interest in Londonderry can be linked to 
Chamberlain’s desire to arrange a meeting between Halifax and Hitler in the 
aftermath of Germany’s pacts with Italy and Japan. Londonderry was informed in 
confidence in advance of the proposed visit and discussed the idea at length with 
Halifax.70 It is notable that Eden recorded at the time that Halifax’s ideas for the visit 
included a ‘Four-Power Pact’.71 Officially, the visit was made in response to a 
hunting invitation, but its main purpose was a meeting between the Führer and 
Halifax on 19 November 1937. Prior to the visit, Londonderry went to Germany and 
briefed Halifax on his discussions.72
 Inevitably, the Halifax–Hitler meeting heightened tensions within the 
government. Against the wishes of Vansittart and Eden, Chamberlain and his 
emissary were keen to impress upon Hitler that any revision to eastern European 
borders should be by peaceful evolution. Having long advocated such direct 
conversations between British and German ministers, Londonderry was disappointed 
that the two men failed to reach an accord.73 He felt that mutual misunderstandings 
between Britain and Germany had got in the way of an agreement, his subsequent 
letters to Ribbentrop emphasising his concern at the damage being done to British 
public opinion by Nazi policies.74 Having failed to persuade his former colleagues of 
the need to better understand German grievances, Londonderry decided to publish his 
views in Ourselves and Germany, one of many books and pamphlets on foreign 
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affairs jostling for public attention at the time. With this small book, which sold 
enough to warrant several reprints throughout 1938 as a ‘Penguin Special’, 
Londonderry increased his public profile as an arch-appeaser and apologist for the 
Nazi regime. 
 The author was selectively clandestine about his visits. Much of what was said 
between Londonderry and the Nazi leaders during his first visit was included in the 
book; what was not we know of through his correspondence with Halifax. Even 
partial openness, however, would backfire. Ourselves and Germany contained 
correspondence with Ribbentrop in which Londonderry addressed the Jewish 
question. Intended as a warning, it was also unthinkingly offensive: 
I should be wrong if I minimized in any way the anxiety which is felt here in 
relation to your policy towards the Jews, for there is the feeling that we do not like 
persecution, but in addition to this there is the material feeling that you are taking 
on a tremendous force which is capable of having repercussions all over the world 
… I have no great affection for the Jews. It is possible to trace their participation in 
most of those international disturbances … on the other hand, one can find many 
Jews strongly ranged on the other side who have done their best ... to counteract 
those malevolent and mischievous activities of fellow Jews.75
For this, Londonderry earned a severe rebuke from a family friend, Anthony de 
Rothschild, who accused him of promoting myths about the worldwide influence of 
Jews and giving respectability to Nazi prejudices.76 Like many others with similar 
views, Londonderry did not regard himself as anti-Semitic, especially as his son-in-
law, Lord Jessel, was Jewish. Indeed, Nazi brutality towards the Jews only reinforced 
the perceived harmlessness of his own prejudices. His statements therefore reveal not 
only poor judgement, but also the pervasiveness and casualness of British anti-
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Semitism.77 For most appeasers, the Jewish question only mattered inasmuch as it 
jeopardised hopes for Anglo-German understanding. Nevertheless, the bad reaction to 
the letter and personal lobbying from British religious groups led Londonderry to 
complain about the issue more frequently to his Nazi contacts, and in April 1938 he 
informed Hitler personally about the harm being done to Anglo-German relations by 
‘reports of the plight of the Jews and those who differed from or opposed the Nazi 
policy’.78 He was still convinced that Hitler cared. 
 Hitler’s unpredictable actions troubled the appeasers, but for many of them, 
including Londonderry, it made their resolve even stronger. So when Halifax replaced 
Eden as Foreign Secretary in February 1938, appeasers were dismayed by the 
Führer’s announcement of a more militant foreign policy. Fearing that a solution was 
slipping away, Londonderry wrote a conciliatory letter to Ribbentrop and called on 
Chamberlain in Parliament not to allow differences to prevent an agreement with 
Germany.79 In private, however, Londonderry informed a colleague in the Anglo-
German Fellowship that he ‘condemned the methods employed’ by Hitler and 
predicted a bleak future.80 Yet appeasers like Londonderry were even more 
determined that an agreement had to be reached in the aftermath of the Anschluss with 
Austria on 13 March 1938. After all, it demonstrated Hitler’s capacity to seize control 
of events and the inability of other powers to control him. Londonderry openly 
criticised the suddenness of the Anschluss, but also warned of war unless there was a 
better understanding of German aspirations.81 This was Londonderry’s public 
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position; in private he admitted to a German correspondent that he did not understand 
Hitler’s recent actions, including his continued persecution of the Jews.82
 Like other appeasers, Londonderry’s sense of mission blinded him to the 
realities of Nazism. He attributed worsening relations between himself and the regime 
to commentary on their policies in Ourselves and Germany, a book he had written to 
promote understanding. On 5 April 1938 he wrote to Hitler defending the publication 
of his book, which was sometimes critical of aspects of Nazi rule, on the basis that he 
needed to address issues that aroused concern in Britain. He also emphasised the 
damage being done to Anglo-German relations by both the persecution of Jews and 
the Anschluss. Appealing to sentiments expressed by the dictator at their first meeting 
in 1936, Londonderry claimed grandiloquently that if an agreement could be reached 
between them, Britain and Germany could rule the world.83 Given his obvious 
inability to deliver such an outcome, it was a desperate attempt to salvage some 
understanding between the two men. Hitler replied with a curt acknowledgment 
thanking Londonderry for a copy of Ourselves and Germany. Subsequently the book 
was refused publication in Germany, until its author leant on Göring.84
 Around the same time Londonderry grew increasingly sensitive about 
suggestions in the Daily Express that he was ‘pro-Nazi’. He wrote to its proprietor, 
Beaverbrook, who had originally encouraged his activities, but far from being 
apologetic, the press baron retorted that his newspaper reflected public opinion.85 
Londonderry replied: 
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I have had a pretty difficult time since I left the Government. I have a friendship 
and an understanding with Neville, because he knows I don’t want anything; but he 
and his colleagues are just a little frightened of me and just a little jealous. I am 
beginning to think of throwing my hand in altogether … I find the Socialists 
proclaiming me a Nazi and Fascist in my judgement two insulting terms and 
contrary to the whole of my point of view. Now the Daily Express joins in and I 
feel that if after all these years I can’t get it across, then I am disposed to leave it all 
alone and fly aeroplanes, travel, play Bridge ... I can’t go on saying I am not a 
Nazi, but have pleaded for justice for Germany.86
 Londonderry made another short visit to Germany at the end of June 1938. 
Contrary to his claim in the second postscript of Ourselves and Germany, the visit 
was not confined to attending the conference of the Fédération Aéronautique 
Internationale as its vice-president. Londonderry also arranged a secret meeting with 
Göring.87 Even the British Air Ministry was kept in the dark; only Halifax received 
Londonderry’s report of discussions with Göring and other leading Nazis.88 
Londonderry noted a change in their attitude to Britain, especially on the part of 
Göring, who he felt was less truculent – a Nazi with whom business could be done. 
Göring informed his guest that Germany’s final demands would be satisfied by the 
settlement of the Sudeten question. In contrast, Ribbentrop and Himmler spoke as 
though they had ‘rehearsed parts’.89 Once again Londonderry was left with the 
impression that a solution was within reach. This was deliberate. Göring’s information 
was designed to encourage British appeasers and counter French opposition to any 
alteration to Czechoslovakia. 
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 As the crisis intensified, Chamberlain flew to Germany for a meeting with 
Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 15 September. Londonderry’s informal contacts were no 
longer useful now that the Prime Minister was meeting Hitler face to face. He was 
nevertheless pleased that his hoped-for summit between the two leaders was finally 
happening.90 After a tense period of diplomatic manoeuvring, the Munich conference 
between the four powers convened on 29 September. The resulting agreement gave 
Hitler the Sudeten territories and guaranteed the remainder of Czechoslovakia through 
an agreement with France and Italy. The following day Chamberlain encouraged 
Hitler to sign the infamous letter declaring their intention never to go to war. As 
Churchill informed Londonderry, ‘Your policy is certainly being tried’.91
 Not satisfied with his cousin’s concession, Londonderry sought to associate 
himself publicly with what appeared to be a major victory for peace.92 He was in 
Munich at the time of the conference, talking with journalists and local people, and 
held a meeting with Göring and Ribbentrop, during which he received typically 
contradictory signals.93 Far from enjoying a hero’s welcome like the Prime Minister, 
however, the only attention Londonderry received was from leftwing critics. Rather 
than ignoring these taunts, Londonderry characteristically rushed to his own defence 
in the press.94 Moreover, he undermined his reputation further when he added his 
name to a letter in The Times from the pro-Nazi ‘Link’ group of politicians, praising 
the Munich agreement.95 He was not the only non-member to add his name, but his 
status as an ex-Cabinet minister made his involvement scandalous considering the 
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group’s reputed connections to Berlin. He paid for his involvement with what he 
called a ‘conspiracy of silence’.96
 
The collapse of peace 
The murderous outrage of Kristallnacht in November 1938 dissolved the campaign 
for Anglo-German friendship and left most appeasers with little choice but to 
abandon, at least outwardly, their support for Germany. An angry Londonderry wrote 
to Göring, complaining that on each occasion he had acted for Germany, Hitler had 
then embarked on a sudden action or policy that he could not explain.97 It ended his 
direct contacts with the Nazi leadership but, in contrast to most appeasers, the rising 
international tension did not lead him to abandon his public calls for an agreement 
between the two countries.98 In March 1939 the Londonderrys visited Stockholm, 
meeting amongst others the Swedish Royal Family. Press reports indicate that 
Londonderry also met the German Legation at Stockholm, although there is no record 
of what was said.99 A few days later, on 15 March, Czechoslovakia was invaded by 
Germany, and divided between it, Poland and Hungary. 
 British public opinion was rocked by Hitler’s repudiation of the Munich 
agreement, for it not only meant that he could not be trusted, but also that war seemed 
increasingly inevitable. Londonderry informed a correspondent that Hitler had 
‘overstepped all limits’, and that he no longer had any confidence in him.100 
Nevertheless, although he made public noises at this time about his patriotism, as did 
other prominent appeasers, Londonderry, did not abandon his hope that war could still 
                                                 
96 Londonderry to Viscount Powerscourt, 26 October 1938, D/3099/2/21/A/107; Londonderry to 
Churchill, 14 November 1938, D/3099/2/5/37A. 
97 Londonderry to Göring, 24 November 1938, D/3099/2/19/184A. 
98 Hansard 5 (Lords), vol. 111, cols 232–40 (30 November 1938); The Times, 14 December 1938; 
Londonderry to Marjorie D. Brooks, 14 December 1938, D/3099/2/19/202. 
99 The Times, 13 March 1939. 
100 Londonderry to Sven Hedin, 20 March 1939, D/3099/2/21/A/191. 
Cardiff Historical Papers 2007/4 
N.C. Fleming 30 
be averted through renewed dialogue.101 He knew, however, that the Nazis had made 
this virtually impossible. After a break of five months, he reopened communication 
with Göring to inform him that he supported Chamberlain’s announcement on 17 
March of a tougher attitude towards Germany, arguing that nobody in Britain would 
listen to his calls for better understanding as Hitler had ‘destroyed’ all his efforts.102 
In early June 1939 he indicated to the former German chancellor, Franz von Papen, 
now ambassador to Turkey, that he regretted it had taken the invasion of Prague for 
him to change his mind about Hitler.103
 Despite this, and an assurance to Halifax that he had left politics, Londonderry 
was drawn back into the crisis by his need to play a role that might transform him into 
a peace-broker.104 On 17 June, a month after a flurry of letters from leading appeasers 
to The Times, Londonderry placed the onus on the Germans by demanding that their 
ambassador in London save Anglo-German relations by challenging press reports 
about Nazi brutality.105 A few days later he wrote again to The Times, this time 
calling for another peace settlement between the ‘Great Powers’.106 Londonderry had 
abandoned his defence of Nazism, but he remained determined to promote a peaceful 
solution. In early July, Philip Conwell-Evans – an ex-appeaser who had forged links 
with German opposition groups – arranged for Londonderry to meet the ‘moderate’ 
Colonel Count von Schwerin of the German General Staff.107 Schwerin was one of a 
number of aristocratic senior officers who regarded Hitler’s military plans as 
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disastrous. Following the meeting, Londonderry dutifully renewed contact with 
Halifax and relayed Schwerin’s desire for British militarily force: 
He ... conveyed that Hitler, being a soldier, would only be impressed by arguments 
given to him by soldiers, and that the political points made very little impression 
upon him. I, of course, retorted that if he wanted a soldier’s answer the only way 
that that could be given was in war, which I was quite certain all peoples … were 
longing to avoid.108
 Halifax appreciated the information, his gratitude only leading Londonderry to 
believe he could perform a useful role by planning yet another visit to Germany.109 As 
soon as Halifax was informed of this he made moves to stop it – Londonderry had 
over-estimated his usefulness. Initially defensive, Londonderry cited his unique 
contacts with the German leadership, claiming these would allow him to declare that 
he had been betrayed by Nazi assurances, and that he ‘represented the spirit of the 
British Government and people in being determined to resist any further 
aggression.’110 It was Hitler’s style to leave his guests with the impression that they 
mattered. Halifax, himself a victim of this, replied that the visit would betray British 
anxiety and look too much like negotiation.111 Londonderry’s attempt at amateur 
diplomacy was at an end. He responded with much chagrin, bitterly attacking the 
Prime Minister for the failures of the National Government.112 His anger was also a 
response to the Nazi–Soviet Pact of 23 August, an agreement that demonstrated just 
how badly the appeasers had misjudged Hitler. Politically ostracised, Londonderry 
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moved to his Ulster estate a few weeks before the outbreak of war on 3 September 
1939.113
 Once the ‘phoney war’ was underway, Londonderry abandoned the promotion 
of an agreement with Germany but not its rationale. He voiced concerns about Soviet 
expansion following a destructive war in the west, was the subject of press 
speculation that he had been interned, and remained president of the Anglo-Hungarian 
Society until August 1940.114 It is, therefore, little wonder that when Hess parachuted 
over Scotland in 1940 in the hope of reaching the fourteenth Duke of Hamilton, he 
carried a document containing the names of sympathetic aristocratic politicians, 
including Londonderry. Despite the mystery surrounding this episode, it is safe to 
conclude that Londonderry was not a member of any ‘Peace Party’. Indeed, he had 
been involved in the fourth Marquess of Salisbury’s senatorial conspiracy to replace 
Chamberlain with Churchill. Refused wartime service in the RAF on account of his 
age, Londonderry’s war was spent carrying out the functionary local duties that many 
of his caste accepted as their only remaining public role. He also wrote his memoirs, 
but failed to receive government approval to publish documents he hoped might 
vindicate him. 
 Londonderry died in 1949 following a series of strokes brought on by a flying 
accident four years earlier. His physical pain mirrored frustrations about his political 
failures, not only his pre-war association with the Nazis, but also the realisation of his 
fears about the consequences of another total war. Internationally, the British Empire 
contracted, the Soviet Union expanded, and American hegemony appeared 
impregnable. Politically, Clement Attlee achieved a landslide victory in the 1945 
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General Election and formed the least aristocratic government since the 
interregnum.115 Two years later Labour nationalised the coal industry, including 
mines that had been owned by the Londonderry family for over a century.  
 
Conclusion 
Londonderry’s support for appeasement was not unusual. Indeed, it was typical of 
many British observers of foreign affairs. Moreover, like many other aristocrats 
engaged in the promotion of Anglo-German understanding, it gave Londonderry a 
renewed sense of political input after decades of steady marginalisation. Such 
participation was intensified by the lack of a clear British foreign policy, Nazi 
encouragement, and the universal fear in Britain of another European war, the last 
with its concomitant danger of Soviet expansion and further imperial decline. As a 
former Cabinet minister, Londonderry stood out amongst the many other noble 
visitors making their way to Hitler. Furthermore, he was one of the few high-profile 
people in the United Kingdom to promote an agreement even after the collapse of the 
Munich accord. Both Chamberlain and Londonderry felt compelled to do whatever 
they could to avoid war, holding not only that it would be futile, but also that it would 
leave Western Europe vulnerable to Soviet expansion. They hoped that a benign, 
almost gentlemanly, approach to diplomacy would tame Hitler – who encouraged 
such notions – and in doing so spectacularly underestimated the dictator’s ambitions. 
 The main distinction between Londonderry and Chamberlain was that it was 
the latter’s job to engage in diplomacy. As Prime Minister, Chamberlain was 
constrained in what he could do by the need to carry his increasingly sceptical Cabinet 
and backbench MPs. Londonderry, on the other hand, took it upon himself, with 
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encouragement from the Nazis, to help the premier’s case by creating an atmosphere 
of greater Anglo-German understanding. In doing so, he overestimated his role as a 
conduit between London and Berlin. He did have limited, if unintentional, uses for 
both governments, as evidenced by Ribbentrop’s memorandum and Halifax’s 
consultations, but Londonderry mistook this for high-level influence and, rather more 
unfortunately, for making a positive contribution. By making himself an arch 
proponent of appeasement through his speeches, books, and visits to Germany, 
Londonderry not only shared the fate of those other ‘guilty men’ whose reputations 
suffered enormously, but also promoted the belief that a lasting Anglo-German 
agreement could be reached, justifying Britain’s refusal to forge a meaningful alliance 
with France. His distrust of the French political system and his sympathy with 
German grievances, even when uttered by Nazis, blinded Londonderry to Hitler’s 
ulterior motives. He became an unwitting agent of Germany’s strategy to divide 
London and Paris. In the final analysis, Hitler destroyed the nineteenth-century world 
that Londonderry and others hoped to save. 
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